Well, let me rephrase that. It’s obvious to everyone watching who is not more concerned with the financial aspects of baseball than actually, you know, enjoying baseball. Somewhere along the way, people stopped picturing themselves as the player and started slotting themselves into the role of the GM. And while it’s fun to rosterbate and come up with plans (I’m just as guilty as anyone of doing this), it’s kind of hard to forget just how much losing absolutely sucks. Tanking is not a guarantee of future success. Grasping at cost-controlled years as if they’re the ultimate treasure only really matters if you use those savings to supplement the other holes in your roster. Chris Sale, Jose Quintana, and Adam Eaton’s insanely team-friendly contracts didn’t amount to a hill of beans when it came to the White Sox building a contending window because the team couldn’t appropriately build around them.

Stockpiling as many prospects as you can at once to guard against failure is a good plan, but eventually you need to start actually promoting them or you’re just creating organizational logjams that result in further hindered development and then stacked salary issues later down the road themselves. There is not a single baseball team that can’t actually afford to pay for free agents. Yes, we all know it’s not the most efficient way to build a team. But you don’t win a trophy for being efficient.

At this point, it is difficult to articulate a reason Eloy Jimenez is still in the minors for baseball reasons.  Perhaps the front office has legitimate developmental concerns for him, but they are not apparent from the outside, and the team declined its most recent opportunity to state them. For a team with less than $10MM worth of guaranteed contracts next season, it is difficult to stomach the appearance that Eloy hitting .400 with power against overmatched competition is worth it to save some money, particularly when the major league product is in real danger of falling behind historically bad Orioles and Royals teams AFTER they sold off their better players.  Unfortunately, the team hasn’t given us any other explanation.  To their credit, they have denied he’s down for service time reasons, although if they said it was for service time reasons they’d be basically admitting to acting in bad faith. Kenny Williams also has mentioned Jimenez’ defense as an area he could improve.  That’s certainly his weakest area, although it’s hard to imagine his defense would cost them on the field in a season like 2018 in the majors, nor is it clear what he’d learn in Triple-A with the glove rather than with the major league coaching staff.  After all this is a team that’s run Daniel Palka in the outfield quite a bit.

I decided to look up how the last three prominent bat-first players the White Sox developed hit in the minors before ultimately being called up to see if they managed to check off those mysterious boxes we’ve all been hearing so much about. Frank Thomas hit .323/.487/.581 over 109 games for Birmingham in 1990 before the Sox did the right thing and let him finish the rest of the year in the majors. He put up an OPS+ of 177 over the next two months before going on to be the best hitter in the AL for the next half decade. Magglio Ordoñez only needed to hit .329/.364/.476 for Charlotte as a 23 year old to prove he was ready in 1997. After a year of league average hitting in 1998, he adjusted and became a legitimate perennial MVP candidate. Carlos Lee wasn’t given a cup of coffee before establishing himself in the majors. After proving himself for an entire season in Birmingham (.302/.350/.485) in 1998, he started 1999 in Charlotte. After a mere 25 games of making International League pitching look weak (.351/.396/.532), the Sox bit the bullet and called him up. Lee developed into a professional hitter in the majors and that was that.

One explanation is that the White Sox are trying to handle this the way the Cubs did Kris Bryant. Bryant absolutely dominated AA and AAA in 2014 (.355/.458/.702 and .295/.418/.619 respectively) but for monetary reasons, received no call-up despite clearly having nothing left to prove in the minors. They even held him back a little longer in 2015 just to game service time a little bit more in one of the most blatant examples of this frustrating practice with the excuse that he needed to work on his defense. And for what? One more year of team control before he hits free agency at the low, low cost of what will probably be around $20-25MM in arbitration and potential hard feelings from the player towards the franchise for a player. Well at least we won’t have to worry about anything like that with Eloy.

Jiménez: “I’m working to be [in Chicago] this year but if the front office or somebody else doesn’t think that I should be there, that is their decision. I’m going to be ready for when the opportunity arrives.”

— James Fegan (@JRFegan) August 2, 2018

Oh.

Lead Photo Credit: Jerome Miron-USA TODAY Sports

In the context of the White Sox rebuild, thinking about scouting and development has become increasingly more interesting as the team has traded for a raft of high-level prospects. One point, among many great ones, that Parks made regularly is about talent versus development. Because his metaphor is far better than any I could come up with, I’m just going to stick with what he said.

Imagine two different pieces of meat. One is of high quality, a porterhouse or filet mignon perhaps, the other is of poor quality, like a flank or cube steak. The natural tendency is to believe that the higher quality meat is going to produce a better meal. When it actuality, it’s quite easy to improperly cook–or just play burn–a good piece of meat, or dress up a cheap piece of meat as something good. The example that Parks uses here is a chicken fried steak–of which I am a fan, but is not common among northerners–as a way to make a lesser cut of meat into something quite tasty and desirable.

Having the flashiest names that appear at the top of prospect lists is great. It usually means that the player will have a large amount of success in his career. But the prospect alone as he sits raw in the minor leagues isn’t enough to cut it. He needs development to become the player that prospect rankings expect him to be. In the same way, the value of lower level prospects can be maximized by great development. The floor of a top-25 guy and the ceiling of an unheralded sleeper frequently overlap.

There are naturally some limitations; freak talents like Bryce Harper can arrive in pro ball with practically every asset needed to succeed and require little to no developmental guidance. On the other side, a pitcher with a fastball that hardly reaches 90 mph and little command will likely never reach the big leagues regardless of the wonderful developmental direction he receives. But in general, development is by far the most important part of a rebuild.

Although the constant comparisons of the process the Sox are undertaking to the Cubs are tiring and usually off-base, the Cubs actually provide a great example of Parks’ point. One of the main things that allowed the Cubs to rebuild both quickly and effectively was the rate at which their prospects succeeded, especially after Theo Epstein was hired and made the organization his own. Some like to think that it was luck that the Cubs got MVP-caliber players in Anthony Rizzo and Kris Bryant, an offensive monster in Kyle Schwarber, and a brilliant young shortstop in Addison Russell, among others. In reality their ability to hit on prospects was due to their incredible developmental staff.

The White Sox made great strides in rebuilding the organization when they made back-to-back Chris Sale and Adam Eaton trades. The additions of Lucas Giolito and Yoan Moncada to the organization brought hope and excitement. What we cannot lose sight of, however, is that improvements in their development team will have to be made for this to mean as much they want it to mean. These players cannot get within reach of their ceilings without proper development.

That may be the biggest roadblock for the White Sox on their journey to becoming a competitive team. If they can improve in this area, there’s no reason to believe that a rebuild can’t work on the South Side. If they continue the same patterns they’ve shown with young players, it will be the same old story for the White Sox, and more players will be added to the list of recent disappointing prospects that includes Gordon Beckham, Jared Mitchell, Courtney Hawkins, and many others. One thing is for certain: development will be key to the White Sox future success.

Lead Image Credit: Mark J. Rebilas // USA Today Sports Images

None of this is necessarily inaccurate. And yet, this sample size of one team, the Cubs, seems to have persuaded many that a hard rebuild is not only the best course of action, it is the only reasonable course of action. Part of the beauty of baseball is that there is no one right way to do things. The Rangers and Giants have consistently reloaded over the years, watching their cores on offense and defense morph significantly without any prolonged dips in success. The 2005 White Sox were somehow remembered as a small ball team even though they hit 200 home runs. The Royals went to back-to-back World Series, winning one, despite having pretty terrible starting pitching. The Baltimore Orioles have been ignoring what everyone says they should do and have made the playoffs three of the last five years.  One Red Sox team won a World Series with a personality of being loose goofballs and another got a bunch of guys fired because they were perceived as loose goofballs. There is no one right way. Someone should write a book about this…

Here’s one problem with using the Cubs as an argument in favor of a hard rebuild: money. Yes, the Cubs traded off everything they could and stockpiled through the draft and Latin America and did so in impressive fashion. And then when they realized they were close to competing they spent a ton of money. For even as skillfully as they loaded up on bats, they were struggling to generate arms from within. So they signed Jon Lester for  six years and $155 million–more than twice the size of the biggest White Sox contract in history–and when they realized they didn’t have anybody on hand to fill out the back of their rotation in a competitive year, they spent another $52 million on John Lackey and Jason Hammel. They also signed Ben Zobrist, Dexter Fowler, and Jason Heyward this offseason as well.*

*It is also worth noting that they signed substantial free agents for second base, corner outfield, and center field despite having multiple well-regarded prospects pretty much ready at all three positions. Worth remembering for when someone tells you the White Sox should try to save $5 million by DFA-ing Brett Lawrie because Tyler Saladino had a good year.**

**Another argument made for the case to DFA Lawrie crowd is that he is brittle, yet Saladino ended the year unavailable because of a herniated disc in his back that affected his right side. 

The lesson here is not that you need to do a hard rebuild every time you hit a playoff drought. The reason to do a hard reset is to generate a cost-controlled, cheap, good core.  You clear salaries that won’t be helpful to you by the time you’re good again, and while being bad accumulate high draft picks. Once that core is in place you spend money to bolster the weaknesses remaining on your roster. That is literally what the Cubs did. The White Sox already have Chris Sale, Jose Quintana, Jose Abreu, Adam Eaton, Tim Anderson, and Carlos Rodon under contract for 2017 for a combined total of $36 million.  That group combined for 25.6 WARP and there is reason to believe they will collectively improve on that mark next year. There are not many teams in the playoffs with that sort of cost-effectiveness at the heart of their roster.

This piece is entitled “The Perils of a Rebuild.” The Cubs are perilous only in the sense that even though they are an example of a successful rebuild, their rebuild still required a lot of spending. An inability or unwillingness to spend has been one of the major impediments to the White Sox succeeding with this group, and there is no reason to believe that they will be more willing to spend in the future relative to the league than they are now.  Before you disagree, realize that the White Sox gave 1,487 PAs to Dioner Navarro, J.B. Shuck, Avisail Garcia, Jimmy Rollins, Carlos Sanchez, Jerry Sands, Leury Garcia, and Jason Coats this year. Avisail had an OPS+ of 91 while primarily playing DH. The rest all had an OPS+ between 52 and 77.  The 77 is Coats. The 52 is Shuck, who was the primary center fielder on the team. That’s more PAs than Eaton and Abreu got combined. For the umpteenth time in the Kenny Williams-Rick Hahn Era, the White Sox have been absolutely throttled by the Gibraltar-sized anchor that is the back half of their roster, while other teams thrive by successfully acquiring stopgaps, spending enough to cover their holes in a meaningful way, and generating talent from within their organization.

But, regardless of how you feel about the current state of the White Sox, I also ask you to consider the Houston Astros. Like the White Sox, for years they refused to accept that a rebuild was probably a good idea, winning between 73 and 86 games from 2006-2010.  Then, in a pretty dramatic volte face, they tanked harder than anybody could remember, losing 100+ games three years in a row. They emerged out of that in 2014 with some really interesting pieces, winning 70, with Jose Altuve and George Springer looking like particularly promising players to build around–indeed, so much so that Sports Illustrated declared them the 2017 World Series champions in advance.  In 2015, they arrived, making SI’s bold proclamation look prescient, winning 86 games and making the Wild Card game, which they won. Carlos Correa seemed to be emblematic of the value of a rebuild, as the No. 1 overall pick burst onto the scene to win a Rookie of the Year Award, and Lance McCullers–another prize of having the surplus draft pool money that comes with having the No. 1 pick–chipped in 125 quality innings in the rotation.

Granted, in hindsight, many of the other key players on that ’15 Astros team had hardly anything to do with a rebuild.  Their  No. 1 and No. 2 starters were Dallas Keuchel, a 7th round pick in 2009, and Collin McHugh who was added off waivers.

Still–hey, here they were–in the winter of 2015-16, coming off of a successful season built on young, cheap stars acquired in their rebuild, went the narrative. And after all, after all those years collecting revenue sharing while they ran out payrolls as low as $29 million in 2013, surely they had socked away lots of money to spend to supplement this Team On The Rise.

But they didn’t. Despite the plethora of free agents this winter, they came away with Doug Fister and that’s about it. Then they won 84 games and missed the playoffs.

The Astros could very well still spend money this winter, although there is less quality to spend it on, and even if they don’t, they could still come back next year and make Sports Illustrated’s prediction come true (or at least make the playoffs again). They did also score Alex Bregman as part of their tanking, which looks promising.

But shouldn’t this team have more than they do after that scorched earth, agonizing three years where the only noteworthy things they did were lose hundreds of games and do stuff like this? What if this is the ceiling of this Astros team if the front office doesn’t spend more money? Should the response be that this Correa-Altuve-Springer core is not good enough, like the pro-rebuild fans say of the White Sox’ current group?

I disagree. I think the most important things you can do are evaluate players well and spend money effectively when it is appropriate.  The Astros let J.D. Martinez, Robbie Grossman, and Jonathan Villar go for free, and drafted Mark Appel over Kris Bryant. They didn’t sign any meaningful free agents to shore up the weaknesses on the roster. So even though they’ve done some things right, it’s now looking very possible that their evaluation is not good enough to make up for their thriftiness.

So yes–if you are selective about the lessons you learn from the Cubs, you can pound your fist on the table and demand that the White Sox sell off everything because you’re sick of the status quo. But I would caution those who believe the path of the hard rebuild is the path to guaranteed success.  Sometimes the path of the hard rebuild is just being really bad and then winding up not much better off on the other end. Sometimes ownership just pockets all those savings instead of re-investing them in the team when it’s good again. Sometimes the problem is that your front office makes too many mistakes and ownership won’t provide the money to make up for it.

You rebuild to acquire cheap superstars.  You don’t do it when you already have them.

Lead Image Credit: Patrick Gorski // USA Today Sports Images

• What looked like a blowout waiting to happen began as a much closer affair before devolving into the anticipated result. The Sox struck first blood with a Ranaudo home run in the fifth. Yes, Anthony Ranaudo, the pitcher. Unfortunately the lead would be short lived as Kris Bryant deposited a hanging breaker into the left field bleachers in the sixth. Ranaudo was chased in the seventh when Javier Baez took a mighty hack at another rolling breaker and put it a thousand rows deep to give the Cubs a 3-1 lead, and a hit parade in eighth put the game well out of reach.

• Ranaudo had a plethora of factors dooming him. First and foremost are the lack of both “stuff” and control that have ended his run as a legitimate prospect. Add in a Cubs lineup that ranks fifth in runs scored. Then, just for good measure, tack on the pressure of his first Sox start. Suffice to say the deck was stacked against him, and the White Sox were not meant to win this game.

Nevertheless, the tall right-hander went out and pitched an admirable game. He spent the first inning flirting with the strike zone about as successfully as a twelve-year-old at the school dance, but was able to pitch around two walks before settling down to retire fifteen of the next sixteen he faced. He somehow carried a no-hitter into the sixth before Bryant’s home run. Renaudo’s mix of low-90s fastball, slider, and curveball kept the Cubs off balance all night, and he left after 6.2 innings surrendering only two hits. Unfortunately both came on rolling thigh-high breakers that were HAMMERED.

• While the Sox bats didn’t do much to help the cause today, they certainly weren’t aided by the Lake-Michigan-sized strike zone given to Cubs pitchers. Pitch Trax had Hammel consistently out of the zone and the called strikes baffled Sox hitters. Much has been made of pitch framing this season, but today’s zone went well beyond the acceptable border calls. Hammel didn’t pitch poorly, but the Sox never had a chance.

•Once again the Sox bullpen looked a mess. Zach Duke was the first in and walked the only batter he faced. Carson Fulmer finished the seventh but his eighth went, hit batsmen-single-double-walk before getting the hook. Jacob Turner was brought in with the bases loaded and no outs. He quickly defused the pressure by serving up an Addison Russell grand slam on his second pitch. When you only have two to three competent relievers, it makes sense to save them for protecting leads, but – yikes! – it can make for some ugly finishes.

• This week in inconsequential trivia, Sox sideline reporter, Siera Santos informed us that Tyler Saladino has pictures of Mr. Miyagi and Bruce Lee on the bottom of his bat handles. So, yea…

Team Record: 50-51

Next game is Thursday at Wrigley at 8:05pm on CSN 

Lead Image Credit: Patrick Gorski // USA Today Sports Images